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Switzerland
The purpose of this paper is to study the diffusion and transformation of scientific
information in everyday discussions. Based on rumour models and social
representations theory, the impact of interpersonal communication and pre-existing
beliefs on transmission of the content of a scientific discovery was analysed. In three
experiments, a communication chain was simulated to investigate how laypeople make
sense of a genetic discovery first published in a scientific outlet, then reported in a
mainstream newspaper and finally discussed in groups. Study 1 (N ¼ 40) demonstrated
a transformation of information when the scientific discovery moved along the
communication chain. During successive narratives, scientific expert terminology
disappeared while scientific information associated with lay terminology persisted.
Moreover, the idea of a discovery of a faithfulness gene emerged. Study 2 (N ¼ 70)
revealed that transmission of the scientific message varied as a function of attitudes
towards genetic explanations of behaviour (pro-genetics vs. anti-genetics). Pro-genetics
employed more scientific terminology than anti-genetics. Study 3 (N ¼ 75) showed that
endorsement of genetic explanations was related to descriptive accounts of the
scientific information, whereas rejection of genetic explanations was related to
evaluative accounts of the information.
Each week new discoveries are reported in scientific journals. Only a fraction of these
discoveries reach laypeople through mainstream media, who then discuss the most
intriguing ones with friends, family, and colleagues (Glasser & Salmon, 1995). The way
scientific information derived from news media is integrated into common-sense
knowledge illustrates how people make sense of unfamiliar scientific phenomena they
encounter in their everyday lives. How do individuals understand, interpret, and
describe the scientific discoveries they learn about in the news? Which elements do
people retain when learning about a discovery? Do pre-existing attitudes shape
understanding and transmission of scientific information?
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse social psychological processes at work in the
transformation process of scientific information by observing how laypeople make
sense of a genetic discovery first published in a scientific outlet, then reported in a
mainstream newspaper, and finally discussed by laypeople. Drawing on both rumour
and social representations research, the current paper investigates the role of position in
a communication chain and the impact of attitudes towards genetic explanations in the
emergence and transmission of scientific discovery. In the following, the relationship
between rumour approaches, social representations theory, and the spread of scientific
discoveries is outlined. Next, the role of representations in science communication is
discussed. The transformation and transmission of scientific discoveries are examined in
the light of these approaches. Three studies were designed to investigate transformation
and transmission processes.
Rumours and representations of scientific discoveries
The transmission of scientific discoveries and the spread of rumours bear several
similarities. Rumours can be conceived as alterations of information that result in an
entirely newmeaning when passing through chains of people (Allport & Postman, 1947;
DiFonzo & Bordia, 2006; Rouquette, 1975; see also Bartlett, 1932). Much like rumours,
scientific knowledge spreads and is transformed when people try to make sense of new,
surprising, or unusual information. Social representations theory explains processes by
which scientific information is integrated into everyday thinking (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999;
Doise, Cle´mence, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993; Moscovici, 1976) and contributes to the
creation of common-sense theories (Cle´mence, 2001).
Moscovici and Hewstone (1983) distinguish scientific thought from representational
common sense in terms of form and content, although common-sense theories are
increasingly based on scientific information (Moscovici, 1976). Scientific thought is
characterized by codes and concepts, and requires empirical validation following formal
procedures, whereas representational thought is collectively built on images and
symbols. Common-sense knowledge is validated by the acceptance of consensual ideas
and norms (Moscovici & Hewstone, 1983), much like trust in rumours that is based on
the gradual transformation of information that converges with stereotypes and
consensual knowledge (Bangerter, 2000; Bordia & DiFonzo, 2002; see also, Lyons &
Kashima, 2003). Social representations emerge when individuals as members of groups
develop a shared understanding of scientific discoveries and topics, such as genetically
modified foods (Gaskell et al., 2000; Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002), AIDS (Joffe,
2003), conception (Wagner, Elejabarrieta, & Lahnsteiner, 1995), or the influence of
classical music on the development of intelligence (Bangerter & Heath, 2004).
Social representations and rumour research converge (see Bangerter & Heath, 2004),
because both study the dynamic nature of information transmission. Nevertheless, the
divergences between the approaches deserve consideration. Social representations
theory focuses on the interplay between shared, collective construction of knowledge,
and individual attitudes towards this knowledge (Moscovici, 1976). The symbolic
production of knowledge is at the core of social representations. Rumour approaches,
in turn, concentrate more specifically on individual and contextual factors involved in
the transmission and transformation of a relevant, but unverified message (DiFonzo &
Bordia, 2006). Rumour content changes are evaluated with respect to veracity and
accuracy. Moreover, the approaches differ in the degree and scope of abstractness of the
object under scrutiny. Investigating the understanding of complex scientific phenomena
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or disease like the origins of AIDS belongs to the social representations realm, whereas
investigating the diffusion of a specific event delimited in time such as a particular
individual or group spreading AIDS falls under rumour research.
Science communication and social representations
Science communication is traditionally perceived as a linear diffusion of scientific facts
translated by the media for the general public (Bucchi, 2004). The dominant view
regards genuine scientific knowledge as objective and pure which becomes distorted
along the way when transmitted to an irrational public. These distortions are the cause
and the consequence of an informational gap between experts and the public. This
deficit model has nevertheless been frequently criticized (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999;
Hilgartner, 1990; Joffe, 2003; Wagner, 2007). First, this view provides scientists a
disproportionate authority to determine which simplifications are distorted and which
in turn appropriate (Hilgartner, 1990). Second, it seems unrealistic to draw a clear-cut
boundary between ‘real’ and popularized science insofar as scientific knowledge is
communicated in diverse contexts varying from scientific journal articles, conference
talks, grant proposals, policy reports to mass media (Hilgartner, 1990). Third and most
importantly for the purposes of this paper, the deficit model downplays the specificity of
the knowledge construction process among lay audiences which has been highlighted
by social representations theory.
In social representations theory, transformation of scientific information is regarded as
creative reconstruction, where the public’s images are not construed as false or biased
representations but as corresponding to reality (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). In this view,
symbolic and emotional aspects, in addition to factual knowledge, contribute to the
collective meaning making of scientific phenomena (Joffe, 2003; Wagner et al., 2002).
Moreover, lay thinking is shaped by pragmatic concerns such asbeing able to communicate
by following news reports and by discussing with fellow citizens (Wagner, 2007).
Transmission and transformation processes of scientific discoveries in
communication
Research has shown that the spread of rumours is dependent upon the characteristics of
the message (e.g. ambiguity), its subjective importance to receivers, and the emotions
(e.g. anxiety) aroused by it (Rosnow, 1988, 1991). Affective elements, in particular,
intensify the spread of and trust in rumours. Heath, Bell, and Sternberg (2001) showed
that disgust intensified the spread of urban legends, a form of information akin to
rumours. Rumour processes are induced when individuals selectively generate
knowledge that is consistent with prior information, thereby increasing its accessibility
(e.g. Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). As a result, when people read of a scientific discovery,
they focus on information that confirms their prior beliefs and construct a coherent
representation of the discovery (e.g. Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). The scientific
news is elaborated and fitted into an existing cognitive framework. In contrast to
individual perspectives in rumour research and cognitive approaches, which investigate
coding and selective retrieval of information, our approach focuses on the social
sensemaking of a scientific message, a core process in social representations theory
(Purkhardt, 1993). This process takes place when laypeople communicate with each
other in the attempt to make sense and collectively cope with ambivalent feelings
induced by encountering new technology like genetically modified food technology
Transmission and transformation of scientific information 499
Copyright © The British Psychological Society
Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society
(Wagner et al., 2002). Insofar as the social nature of rumours arises from communication
(Bordia & DiFonzo, 2002, 2004; Shibutani, 1966), rumour mongering is also a form of
social sensemaking.
Our study focuses on the communication process resulting from a scientific
discovery that starts from a scientific publication and then continues in regular media
outlets, eventually ending as everyday discussions (e.g. Sommer, 1998). Rumour
research investigates howmessages are transformed through levelling and sharpening of
information (Allport & Postman, 1947; DiFonzo & Bordia, 2006). Accordingly, a message
gets shorter, simplified, and more concise the further it moves along a communication
chain. Moreover, striking, bizarre, or counter-intuitive aspects of the message are
emphasized (see also Barrett & Nyhof, 2001). In social representations theory, levelling
and sharpening have been understood as part of the objectification process through
which individuals provide abstract and precise scientific information with a figurative
and concrete meaning (Moscovici, 1976). When scientific discoveries are diffused to the
public sphere, expert terminology used in scientific articles is replaced by everyday
terminology necessary for the comprehension of newspaper articles. News articles
feature metaphors that allow the reader to visualize a scientific phenomenon (Kua,
Reder, & Grossel, 2004) and create newmeanings of it (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). For
example, in the context of genetic engineering, ‘Dolly the sheep’ objectified cloning
(Gaskell, 2001). In a similar vein, Wagner et al. (1995) showed that popular thinking
about conception is based on sex role and sexual metaphors (see also Bangerter, 2000).
Sperm was characterized with stereotypically active behaviour of men whereas the ova
were described with passive female traits. Studies 1 and 2 analyse the objectification that
takes place when laypeople encounter a genetic discovery.
In parallel to objectification, information is incorporated into pre-existing
knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes. This assimilation (rumour research) or anchoring
(social representations theory) of information in pre-existing shared social knowledge is
a social act (Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Bordia & DiFonzo, 2002; Heath et al.,
2001; see also Smith & Semin, 2004; Staerkle´ & Cle´mence, 2004). Individuals
actively process information by participating in discussions on the topic. As a result,
interpretation and transformation of information is shaped by contextual norms
determined by group membership as well as by pre-existing beliefs and attitudes
(Lorenzi-Cioldi & Cle´mence, 2001; Moscovici, 1976). Studies 2 and 3 explore the impact
of pre-existing attitudes on the transformation and diffusion of a scientific finding.
The current research draws on both social representations and rumour research
when investigating the transmission and transformation processes related to the
communication of a scientific discovery. Adopting a social representational view, we
conceive the differential use of expert and lay vocabulary in accounting for scientific
discoveries as a reconstruction of information and not a deterioration of information.
Rumour models, in turn, illustrate the chain-like serial transmission of a scientific
discovery moving from a scientific source to laypeople.
Communicating the discovery of a faithfulness gene
In the present research, we study the communication of an unfamiliar, yet intriguing
genetic discovery. The transformation during this communication process occurs in two
steps (Durant, Hanson, & Bauer, 1999). First, information is transformed when a daily
newspaper publishes an article originating from a scientific journal. Next,
transformation continues when laypeople read this newspaper article and describe its
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content to others. The three studies presented in this paper concentrate on the latter
part of the communication chain. The first step is only briefly outlined.
From a scientific journal to a daily newspaper
The original scientific article ‘Increased affiliative response to vasopressin in mice
expressing the V1a receptor from a monogamous vole’ (Young, Nilsen, Waymire,
MacGregor, & Insel, 1999), published in Nature, described the impact of a hormone
called vasopressin in two species of voles, prairie and montane voles. The two species
differ on certain cerebral areas that are linked to the reception of vasopressin.
An increase of this hormone was shown to ‘increase affiliative behaviour in the highly
social, monogamous prairie vole, but not in the relatively asocial, promiscuous montane
vole’ (Young et al., 1999, p. 766). Young et al. studied the molecule structure of the
receptor gene of vasopressin and found that the DNA sequence of monogamous and
promiscuous voles differs. They further showed that mice that were transgenic for the
prairie vole receptor gene ‘exhibited increased affiliative behaviour after injection with
arginine vasopressin’ (p. 766).
Two days later the results were reported in a highly respected French newspaper,
Le Monde (Bursaux,1999) with the title ‘Polygamous by nature, the mouse has become
faithful due to a gene inserted by American researchers’ (our translation). The original
article reported a discovery of a gene linked to temporary affiliative tendencies of
laboratory voles, whereas the article of Le Monde speculates on human applications
concerning faithfulness in intimate relationships and on transformation of behaviour.
A complex scientific discovery on rodents is given a concrete meaning – sexual
faithfulness (see Green & Cle´mence, 2002 for an account on transformations that
occurred when the discovery published in Nature was reported in Le Monde).
From a daily newspaper to lay thinking: Overview of studies
Three studies were carried out to examine the onward communication of the article
published in Le Monde (hereafter the reference text). Our focus is upon the
transmission of the meaning of this article. Studies 1 and 2 were designed to simulate a
communication chain. The participants were randomly assigned to the role of a reader
or a listener. The former read the article published in Le Monde, whereas the latter read
a text that was unrelated to genetics. Then the readers described the text to the
listeners. The main objective of this procedure was to examine the changes in the
central terminology first employed in Le Monde, then in oral accounts given by readers
of the text, and finally in written accounts by the readers as well as by the listeners. On
the basis of the general predictions outlined above, we expect that the information
about the genetic discovery will be simplified and summarized around a core idea, by
giving it a concrete and figurative meaning (objectification hypothesis). Specialized
terminology used in scientific domains should disappear gradually when the
information moves along the communication chain. However, the information should
be conserved in the form of everyday terminology in the listener’s accounts. Therefore,
readers are expected to employ both expert and lay vocabulary, whereas listeners
should focus on lay vocabulary. We consider that lexical transformation involves a
transformation of the specific sense of the discovery when employed in another
narrative area (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Potter, 1996). Narrow empirical
hypothesis testing described in the scientific area of genetics, becomes a possible
explanation of human behaviour in a mundane area.
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Participants should also extend their accounts of the discovery with new terms to
the extent that interpretation and diffusion of the genetic discovery depends on an
individual’s attitudes towards genetics. The objective in Studies 2 and 3 is to investigate
the role of pre-existing attitudes on the transmission and transformation of the discovery
(anchoring hypothesis). Insofar as individuals hold diverging pre-existing attitudes, they
will focus on different elements when reading or hearing about the genetic discovery.
Therefore, the accounts should differ as a function of these attitudes. The participants
endorsing genetic explanations of behaviour are expected to preserve more expert
terminology from the reference text and be more descriptive in their accounts than
individuals unfavourable to genetic explanations. Those favouring genetic explanations
should pay more attention than others to the scientific demonstration of the
experiment, because they find support for their attitudes. Those with unfavourable
views concerning genetic explanations, in turn, should be more inclined to search for
arguments and evidence that disqualify the initial message.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants and procedure
Forty persons (20 women; age range 19–45 years) from a Swiss town in the French
speaking region participated in the study. The study, introduced as research on the
understanding and diffusion of news messages, had four phases. First, participants
completed a questionnaire assessing their knowledge of genetic experiments and
interest in scientific topics. In the second phase, participants were organized into
groups of four with two ‘readers’ (N ¼ 20) who read the reference text on the genetic
discovery, and two ‘listeners’ (N ¼ 20) who read an unrelated article. The participants
were told that they would be discussing their texts with other participants. The texts
were removed and, in the third phase, the readers presented the content of the article to
the listeners and they discussed the topic. At the final fourth stage, all participants wrote
a description of the article they had read (readers) or had been presented to them
(listeners). Readers and listeners did not differ in self-evaluated knowledge of genetic
experiments or in interest in scientific information, measured with answers on 5-point
scales to questions such as ‘How would you evaluate your knowledge in the domain of
genetics?’ or ‘Are you in favour of genetic research?’.
Dependent variables: Expert and common-sense terms
Eighteen terms from the narratives, crucial to the understanding of the finding, were
used to investigate the development of expert and lay terms (see Table 1). A textual data-
analysis programme (Alceste) was employed to initially select the terms as a function of
their frequency in the original Le Monde article and the final written accounts. Words
needed for syntactic construction (i.e. articles, prepositions, pronouns), not recognized
by a French dictionary (i.e. numbers, unknownwords, onomatopoeia), or cited less than
four times in the entire corpus were discarded automatically. The 18 retained words
represented approximately a third of each text corpus. Frequently occurring terms
that did not contribute to the understanding of the finding, such as experiment or
behaviour, were excluded.
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Support for the distinction of expert and lay terms was sought by comparing citation
rates in three on-line databases (see Appendix). Lay terms are words commonly used in
everyday communication; therefore they should occur frequently in these databases
aimed for a general public. Expert terms, in turn, are used more restrictedly in scientific
communication by a small circle of specialists and thus should be cited on the internet
more rarely than everyday terminology. Comparisons of the 18 expert and lay termswere
made with genetic (arginine, vasopressin, receptor, gene), animal (vole – montane and
prairie; mammal; mouse; rat; and animal) and affiliation (monogamy, polygamy,
faithfulness, infidelity) related terms. Nine of the eighteen terms qualified as expert terms
and eight were lay terms. The term humanwas included separately. Lay termswere cited
substantially more than expert terms, despite the considerable variation in the citation
frequencies. Animal-related words were the most cited. Though mammal was
considered an expert term it was cited frequently in the headings of French websites.
Nevertheless, the term animalwas cited over 60 times more frequently thanmammal.
Results
As the scientific discovery moved along the communication chain, its subsequent
versions contained less and less words and details. The Le Monde article contained 694
words, the written accounts of readers contained on average 125 words and the written
accounts of listeners 93 words. Our focus was on the evolution of the 18 words retained
from the reference text to the listeners’ accounts and the relative use of expert and lay
terminology (Table 1). The comparison of the readers’ presentations with the reference
text revealed that four expert terms were focused upon (vole, montane, monogamy,
polygamy) and two terms disappeared or decreased (arginine, mammal ). For lay
terms, in turn, four terms of the reference text were retained (hormone, gene, mouse,
faithfulness). Four new terms (terms absent from the Le Monde article) also emerged
(rat, field, animal, unfaithfulness). McNemar tests (see Table 1) revealed that
differences between readers’ presentations and their written accounts were small,
though the new lay terms that emerged in presentations disappeared again in the
written accounts. However, considerable evolution between the presentations and the
listeners’ accounts was observed. With the exception of the word vole and faithfulness
related terms, expert terminology decreased drastically in accounts written by
participants that only heard about the discovery. The lay terms of the reference text, in
turn, remained consistent in the accounts of listeners. The term human had a
substantial presence in the accounts, though it was cited only twice in the reference
text. The repetition of a term in the reference text did not contribute to its use in the
subsequent presentations or written accounts.
For a more comprehensive test of our prediction that expert terminology disappears
as a scientific message moves along a communication chain, the evolution of the
number of expert and lay terms between readers’ and listeners’ written accounts were
investigated. A 2 (position in chain: reader vs. listener) £ 2 (use of expert vs. lay terms in
account) analysis of variance was performed with repeated measures on the last factor.
A main effect in position of chain was yielded Fð1; 38Þ ¼ 7:15, p , :05; h2 ¼ :16.
Readers (M ¼ 7:40, SD ¼ 2:11) used more words in the accounts than listeners
(M ¼ 5:80, SD ¼ 1:64). This effect was qualified with an interaction, Fð1; 38Þ ¼ 8:79,
p , :005; h2 ¼ :19. In line with our prediction, readers used more expert terms than
listeners, Fð1; 38Þ ¼ 10:96; p , :005, whereas position in the communication chain did
not influence use of lay terms, Fð1; 38Þ , 1, (Figure 1).
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Discussion
This study demonstrated, as expected, a transformation of information when the
scientific discovery moved along the communication chain. The successive narratives
evolved in a disappearance of scientific expert terminology and in the persistence of
scientific information associated with lay terminology. Corroborating the objectification
hypothesis, the remaining termsmade the scientific information concrete. First, scientific
(monogamy, polygamy) and lay ( faithfulness) terms related to faithfulness persisted
through the communication chain. Second, new terms emerging in the presentations
related everyday knowledge to the scientific message. For example, prairie voles were in
some cases substituted by field rats. When the diffusion of the scientific message
progressed along the communication chain, it became a schematic story of the discovery
of a faithfulness gene, extracted from a vole or rat species, with questions raised about
gene transfer to humans and with few elements remaining from the reference text. The
following is a typical account of the article published in Le Monde (our translation):
This text is about a genetic discovery. American researchers put a chip (a gene) in field voles
to see if these voles become faithful or not. They did experiments with rats and voles. They
reacted differently depending on where they came from (country or city). Some became
polygamous, other monogamous. The main question is: can this gene be put into humans.
Would humans suddenly become faithful? One cannot really draw conclusions from this
experiment because depending if it was a rat, a mouse or a vole, the species reacted
differently despite the same gene that was put in all of them. [Listener nr. 8]
STUDY 2
The first aim of the second study was to replicate the transformation of information
demonstrated in Study 1. The same procedure and lexicon measure was used but, in
addition, a more rigorous control of the transformation process was provided by a
Figure 1. Mean frequency of expert and lay terms as a function of position in communication chain
(Study 1).
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word selection task. Comparing the lexicon employed in participants’ written
accounts with the word selection task allows assessing the extent to which the
communication of a message differs from its encoding in memory. While choosing a
word used in the initial text is a recall task for the readers, it should be considered an
inference task for listeners who were expected to derive missing textual elements to
understand the discovery (see also Graesser et al., 1994; Sperber & Wilson, in press).
In line with the objectification hypothesis, words reflecting a simplified concrete
account of the discovery should be selected. Moreover, listeners should prefer words
from the lay realm over expert terminology in accounting for the discovery. The
participants’ written accounts were also content coded by independent judges.
Thereby, the results showing a transformation of information along the
communication chain based on the 18 expert and common-sense terms derived in
Study 1 as well as the word selection task could be externally validated. The texts
were coded to reveal central themes of the reference text (e.g. transforming a
polygamous mouse to monogamous) and recurring topics that emerged in
participants’ written accounts (e.g. faithfulness gene).
The second aim was to investigate how participants’ initial attitudes towards
genetic explanations of behaviour intervened in the transformation and diffusion
process. In the presentation and discussion phase of Study 1, a number of
participants expressed the difficulty to understand why some people, in particular
males, were faithful to their partners while others were not, despite similar
sociocultural backgrounds and cognitive development. A genetic explanation of
faithfulness provided a possible clarification to these inquiries. Other participants, in
contrast, did not accept attributing genetic reasons for social behaviours. This
difference in initial positions is expected to moderate the transformation and
transmission of the original scientific message. The initial message converges with the
positioning of those favourable towards genetics. They should, more than
participants critical of genetic explanations, evoke the expert information when
describing the text that they are exposed to. This lexical variation suggests that those
in favour and those against genetic explanations select a narrative area allowing them
to express their point of view (Potter, 1996).
Method
Participants
Eighty-four people ranging from 19 to 50 years from a French speaking Swiss town
participated in the study. Fourteen participants failed to complete the entire experiment
and were excluded from the analyses leaving us with 70 participants (36 women).
Procedure and materials
As in Study 1, the experiment had four phases. First, participants completed the same
questionnaire as in the previous study. In addition, their opinion on a set of explanations
for social behaviour was assessed to distinguish participants favouring genetic
explanations of behaviour from those rejecting them. The participants indicated to what
extent they thought everyday behaviour was determined by genes (1 ¼ not at all,
4 ¼ very much), if they thought it is possible to modify the behaviour of animals by
modifying their genes (1 ¼ not at all, 4 ¼ absolutely) and if they thought
aggressiveness is related to genes (1 ¼ not at all, 4 ¼ absolutely). In a second
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phase, half of the participants were randomly assigned to read the article published in
Le Monde (readers, N ¼ 35), while the other half read an article unrelated to genetics
(listeners, N ¼ 35). In the third phase, readers were paired with listeners to present and
discuss the article. In the final fourth stage, participants wrote an account of the article
on genetics that they had read (readers) or that had been presented to them (listeners)
and then completed a word selection task in which they indicated for a set of terms
whether or not they had occurred in the initial reference text. Half of the selected terms
were actually present (vasopressin, montane vole, sexual faithfulness, family
behaviour, evolution, adaptation) and the other half absent (testosterone, faithfulness
gene, climate change, vaccination, field rat, questionable result) from the text. This
task as well as the 18 expert and lay terms derived fromwritten accounts in Study 1 were
employed as dependent variables to investigate evolution of information.
Defining pro- and anti-genetics
In order to compare those favouring genetic explanations with those rejecting them, a
K-means cluster analysis was conducted to group respondents as a function of their
positioning towards the three questions on genetic explanations of behaviour. The
retained two cluster solution separated individuals agreeing with genetic explanations
of behaviour (N ¼ 45), called pro-genetics from here on, from those rejecting these
explanations (N ¼ 25), the anti-genetics. Pro-genetics agreed to a greater extent than
anti-genetics that everyday behaviour is determined by genes (M ¼ 2:65 vs. M ¼ 1:48),
that it is possible to modify the behaviour of animals by modifying their genes (M ¼ 3:20
vs.M ¼ 2:24) and that aggressiveness is related to genes (M ¼ 2:51 vs.M ¼ 1:28, for all
comparisons, tð69Þ . 2:45, p , :05). Pro- and anti-genetics were distributed equally
among readers and listeners, x2 ¼ :06, ns.
External validation was achieved with a set of items tapping different explanations of
behaviour and genetics (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). Pro-genetics believed more
than anti-genetics that alcoholism and homosexuality can be explained by genetic
factors, faithfulness is determined by heredity, and the reported experiment in Le Monde
demonstrated genetic origins of faithfulness (for all comparisons, tð68Þ . 2:45,
p , :05). However, pro- and anti-genetics did not differ in self-evaluated knowledge on
genetics, nor on endorsement of personality, social, and moral explanations of
behaviour, thereby demonstrating that the cluster solution distinguished participants
solely as a function of endorsement of genetic explanations.
Coding
To detect five central themes of the reference text and of the participants’ discussions,
two independent coders indicated the extent to which each text (a) mentioned the
discovery of a faithfulness gene; (b) stated that a polygamous mouse became
monogamous in the experiment; (c) discussed applying the results to humans; (d)
contained scientific terminology used in the reference text; and (e) evoked limits in the
realization of the experiment (e.g. failure of experiment, worked only for certain
animals). The coders indicated with a 3-point scale if an idea or theme was present
(1 ¼ absent, 2 ¼ partially present or 3 ¼ present). They were advised to use the
partially present response alternative when the theme or idea was included in a
participant’s written account, but the employed vocabulary was different. Inter-rater
reliabilities based on comparisons of the 70 texts were high (all g . :85).
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Results
Evolution of terminology in communication chain
Evolution of information (18 terms) from the readers’ presentations to the listeners’
written accounts followed a very similar pattern as in Study 1. Table 1 reveals that again
the use of all expert terms decreased massively, most of them disappearing in the
listeners’ accounts. Only the word vole and the faithfulness related terms (monogamy
and polygamy) remained. The lay terminology, including human, persisted.
Anchoring as a function of pre-existing attitudes and position in the communication
chain
To understand the degree to which information is incorporated into pre-existing
attitudes (anchoring hypothesis) and communication context, the impact of attitudes
towards genetic explanations and of position in the chain on the number of expert and
lay terms in the accounts was examined. A 2 (position in chain: reader vs. listener) £ 2
(attitudes: pro-genetics vs. anti-genetics) £ 2 (expert vs. lay terms in account) analysis of
variance was conducted, with repeated measures on the last factor. A main effect of the
position in chain was revealed, Fð1; 66Þ ¼ 18:90, p , :001; h2 ¼ :22. Replicating the
results of Study 1, readers (M ¼ 7:40, SD ¼ 1:96) used more words in their accounts
than listeners (M ¼ 5:23, SD ¼ 1:75). This reader–listener main effect was again
qualified by a within-subject interaction with the repeated measure, Fð1; 66Þ ¼ 10:29,
p , :005, h2 ¼ :14, revealing that listeners employed less expert terms than readers,
Fð1; 66Þ ¼ 21:69; p , :001, but position in communication chain had no effect on lay
terms, Fð1; 66Þ ¼ 1:72; ns (see Figure 2). More importantly, in line with the anchoring
hypothesis, people endorsing genetic explanations of behaviour preserved expert
vocabulary that supported their beliefs when describing the discovery. A within-subject
interaction with the repeated measure and attitudes towards genetic explanations,
Fð1; 66Þ ¼ 5:52; p , :05; h2 ¼ :08, demonstrated that pro-genetics employed expert
Figure 2. Mean frequency of expert and lay terms as a function of position in communication chain
(Study 2).
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terms more frequently than anti-genetics, Fð1; 66Þ ¼ 5:38; p , :05, whereas the mean
number of lay terms did not differ between both groups, Fð1; 66Þ , 1 (Figure 3). No
other main effects or interactions reached significance.
Reader–listener difference in word selection
Selection of terms present in the reference text was accessed. Unsurprisingly, readers
(M ¼ 8:97, SD ¼ 1:98) gave more correct answers than listeners (M ¼ 6:83,
SD ¼ 2:20), Fð1; 68Þ ¼ 18:34, p , :001; h2 ¼ :21. This result simply reveals that
the listeners needed to infer terms that were not evoked by the reader who
presented the text to them. However, the relevance of the comparison of word
choice between the groups is threefold. First, we verified that the original scientific
information was transformed into a simplified schematic idea. Eighty per cent of
readers and 83% of listeners affirmed that a faithfulness gene was mentioned.
Moreover, both readers and listeners cited correctly family behaviour (74 and 71%,
respectively) and sexual faithfulness (74 and 91%). Second, the results revealed the
emergence of lay terminology to complement the expert message. Both readers and
listeners correctly mentioned the presence of montane vole (97 and 89%,
respectively) in the text. However, 71% of listeners also inferred that field rats
were mentioned in the initial text, whereas only 9% of readers made this error,
Cramer’s V ¼ :64, p , :001. Third, all readers recalled vasopressin, but only 49% of
listeners evoked it (Cramer’s V ¼ :59, p , :001), indicating that readers retrieve
scientific terms that they did not use when communicating the information in their
presentations. Listeners also erroneously cited testosterone more often than readers
(29% vs. 6%; Cramer’s V ¼ :303, p , :05). Finally, a questionable result was cited
incorrectly by 17% of readers and 60% of listeners, Cramer’s V ¼ :44, p , :001. No
other significant differences between readers and listeners were evidenced. In the
word selection task, pro-genetics (M ¼ 8:15) did not give more correct responses
than anti-genetics (M ¼ 7:44), Fð1; 66Þ ¼ 1:59, ns.
Figure 3. Mean frequency of expert and lay terms attitudes towards genetic explanations (Study 2).
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Validation of reader–listener effect in content transformation
The impact of position in the chain on the presence of coded themes was examined. In
support of the findings on the use of expert and lay terminology indicating that amessage
is simplified when it moves along the transmission chain, the results demonstrated that
readers employed more scientific terminology (M ¼ 1:63, SD ¼ 0:73), evoked more
often that the experiment transformed polygamous mice to be monogamous (M ¼ 2:66,
SD ¼ 0:54), and referred more to human applications (M ¼ 1:83, SD ¼ 0:75) than
listeners did (M ¼ 1:17, SD ¼ 0:45; M ¼ 2:14, SD ¼ 0:65; M ¼ 1:49, SD ¼ 0:61,
respectively), Fð1; 69Þ ¼ 8:72, p , :01, h2 ¼ :12; Fð1; 69Þ ¼ 10:76, p , :01, h2 ¼ :14;
Fð1; 69Þ ¼ 4:94, p , :05, h2 ¼ :07, respectively. Moreover, the presence of the three
themes was positively related to the number of employed scientific terms (all rs . :30,
p , :001). Position in the communication chain was not related to evoking limits in the
experiment and a faithfulness gene in the text.However, a third of theparticipants evoked
a faithfulness gene confirming an overarching emergence of the idea. Pre-existing
attitudes did not affect the presence of these themes in the accounts.
Discussion
The results replicate the evolution of information throughout the communication chain
found in Study 1. Again, the initial information was transformed by a decrease of
scientific terms on the one hand and a stability of lay terminology on the other. The
results of the word selection task supported this finding. This occurred especially
among listeners, located at the end of the communication chain. Nevertheless,
independent of one’s position in the communication chain, participants mentioned a
faithfulness gene. Though genetic determination of faithfulness was evoked, the
existence of a specific faithfulness gene was never mentioned in the text. Readers
recalled expert terms (e.g. vasopressin) more often than listeners, though they did not
use the term in the written accounts. This result indicates that the diffusion process,
conceptualized here as a communication chain, differs from individual encoding in
memory. Readers abandon expert terms, though they can retrieve them from memory,
presumably to enhance understanding of a scientific experiment and thus to improve
transmission to others (Smith & Semin, 2004; Wagner, 2007). Listeners at the end of the
chain, in turn, are forced to introduce new lay terms to interpret and give meaning to the
readers’ scientific narrative. Results on content coded themes provided further
validation by showing that the scientific terminology and the core message are altered
when the message moves from a reader to a listener.
In line with our predictions, endorsement of genetic explanations had an impact on
the terminology employed in the participants’ accounts of the discovery. Pro-genetics
employed more information from the original article than anti-genetics. This difference
was not due to differences in knowledge concerning genetics or to neglect of other
explanations of behaviour. In summary, greater expertise in genetics did not explain that
individuals supporting genetic explanations employed elements of the scientific
experiment. We suggest that the performance of pro-genetics was induced by their
beliefs that converged with the initial message allowing them to focus on the textual
argumentation. Persons rejecting a genetic explanation, in turn, were confronted with
information contradicting their beliefs. They may be inclined to search for elements
disqualifying the discovery of a genetic explanation for faithfulness. Individuals holding
anti-genetic stances may thus replace expert terms with lay terms they master and that
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match their belief system. By changing the narrative area, participants described a
version of the story that supports their beliefs. As Potter (1996, p. 187) asserts, ‘the
choice of boundaries and the huge range of descriptive terms available mean that highly
contrasting versions of the ‘same thing’ can be produced while resisting criticisms of
inaccuracy, falsehood or active confabulation.’ This explanation also finds support in
rumour research (Rouquette, 1975).
STUDY 3
The last study further investigated the transmission process as a function of converging
or diverging stances towards genetic explanations. The main objective of this study was
to gather more evidence that individuals supporting, more than those opposing, a
genetic explanation of behaviour remain closer to the content of the message when
interpreting information related to the scientific discovery. Instead of asking
participants to write a description of the scientific discovery, participants were invited
to associate keywords to the message. These keywords were then coded as descriptive
or evaluative. On the basis of the anchoring conjecture positing that information is
incorporated into pre-existing attitudes, we expect that endorsement of genetic
explanations is related to descriptive associations, since the message is consistent with
one’s attitudes, whereas rejection of genetic explanation should be related to evaluative
accounts of the information. Individuals opposing genetic explanations should take a
more critical stance, because the information is incongruent with their beliefs. This
prediction is supported by the fact that the coding of participants’ opinions in Study 2
revealed that anti-genetics mentioned that faithfulness is socially acquired.1 This stance
converges with the idea that faithfulness is not genetically determined. Moreover, anti-
genetics feared the implications of the finding with respect to romantic relationships
more frequently than pro-genetics did.
Method
Participants
Eighty-seven people aged 16–76 from a French speaking Swiss town participated in a
study. Five participants failed to complete the entire experiment and seven
misunderstood the task. They were eliminated from the analyses. The final sample
consisted of 75 participants (51 women).
Procedure and material
The participants first answered a questionnaire assessing their position towards genetic
explanations of behaviour identical to the one used in Study 2. This time, everyone read
the Le Monde reference text in the second phase and then, to simulate a presentation,
listened to a taped account of the text. Finally, participants were asked to associate three
keywords to the description they heard. The generated keywords constituted the
dependent measures of this study.2
1 In addition to writing an account on the reference article, participants were invited to write their opinion about the study on a
separate sheet. These data were not presented in the current paper.
2 Participants were randomly assigned to listen to one of two versions of a taped description of the text. However, because the
descriptions were evaluated similarly by the participants they were pooled and analysed together.
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As in the previous study, participants were separated, by means of a hierarchical
cluster analysis, into pro-genetics (N ¼ 43) and anti-genetics (N ¼ 32) as a function of
their positioning towards three questions on genetic explanations of behaviour.
Results and discussion
Keywords associated to the taped description were first coded as either descriptive or
evaluative. A dichotomous measure was employed because 66 participants (88%)
provided either only descriptive or only evaluative terms. Thus, associations were coded
as descriptive when all three keywords were present in the text or taped description
(e.g. vasopressin, faithfulness gene, behaviour, genetic modification, etc.), whereas
associations were considered evaluative when one or more of the keywords expressed a
critical judgment (e.g. confusion, subjective, credulity, imprecise, dangerous etc).
Thirty-four (45%) respondents associated evaluative terms to the keywords to the
description they heard.
The anchoring hypothesis was tested by observing the impact of endorsement of
genetic explanations (pro-genetics vs. anti-genetics) on the style of keywords associated
to the description (descriptive vs. evaluative keywords). Corroborating our hypothesis,
an association between the connotation of keywords associated to the taped description
and the endorsement of genetic explanation of behaviour was demonstrated,
x2ð1Þ ¼ 6:64, p , :01. Seventy-one per cent (29 out of 41) of respondents using a
descriptive style were pro-genetics, whereas there were only 41% (14 out of 34) of pro-
genetics among respondents using the evaluative style. That is, pro-genetics made more
descriptive accounts and anti-genetics made more evaluative accounts. The results
showed that the convergence between ones beliefs and the content of the message was
associated to a more descriptive processing of information compared with the situation
when beliefs and the message were incongruent. This indicates that the interpretation
of a scientific message depends on the pre-existing attitudes of individuals participating
in its diffusion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Three studies investigated the diffusion of scientific news concerning a genetic
discovery. We focused on the objectification of news about the influence of vasopressin
on the sociability of voles and the anchoring processes driven by endorsement or
rejection of genetic explanation of behaviour. Taken together, Studies 1 and 2
demonstrated that expert and scientific traces decreased with a shift towards everyday
language as the message moved along the communication chain from the article
published in Le Monde to accounts made by individuals who only hear about the
discovery. Illustrating the objectification process of scientific information, a simplified
figurative meaning of the message was progressively formed. The original scientific
message about the discovery of the impact of vasopressin on the sociability of voles was
crystallized into a faithfulness gene.
The rumour paradigm analysed through the lens of social representations theory
improves the understanding of a particular communication and sense-making process in
which information circulates through chains of individuals and groups (see also
Bangerter, 2000). The link between differential lexicon use and social sense making in
this process deserves some discussion. A move along the communication chain was
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characterized with an evolution of vocabulary from a scientific semantic universe
towards a mundane semantic universe. This was evidenced notably with a variation in
category use (e.g. Lakoff, 1987). In the scientific realm and early in the chain precise
examples of a biological category, like voles, were evoked. Further in the chain,
categories became more approximate. More familiar and typical examples from the lay
realm which resemble the original example such as rat and mouse from the rodent
category were associated to the discovery. Superordinate categories such as animals in
general were also maintained in the message as it progressed. The semantic shift, as
exemplified by a switch in categories is driven by a pragmatic goal of meaning making
(Potter, 1996). Much like analogies or metaphors in scientific communication (Gentner,
1982; Maasen & Weingart, 1995; see also Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), words were drawn
from a mundane vocabulary instead of a scientific vocabulary in order to interpret and
understand the meaning of the genetic discovery.
To our knowledge, this research is one of the first to study experimentally the
transmission of scientific narratives as a function of pre-existing attitudes. Studies 2 and
3 demonstrated that the development of the scientific message depended on personal
endorsement of genetic explanations. For individuals accepting genetic explanations of
behaviour, the information was transformed to a lesser extent and remained closer to
the initial content, including scientific terminology, than for those rejecting genetic
explanations. Moreover, pro-genetics were more descriptive in their accounts, whereas
anti-genetics gave more evaluative accounts of the discovery. That is, supporters of
genetic explanations anchored the information in their existing belief system that is
consistent with the findings. For those rejecting genetic explanations, the findings were
inconsistent with their belief system and they were thus more critical. The classification
distinguishing pro- and anti-genetics converged in the two studies, revealing its
robustness and allowing the exclusion of the possibility that our results were driven by
the level of expertise of the respondents.
As suggested by social representations approaches, the transmission and
transformation processes demonstrated in the three studies were presumably shaped
by simultaneously operating communicational requirements as well as personal
relevance and attitudinal factors (Wagner, 2007). The same initial message therefore led
to different stories at the end of the communication chain. Objectification of the
scientific message was driven by pragmatic communicational concerns. A commu-
nicator must provide some evidence of a meaning (e.g. existence of a genetic basis for
affiliation) such that the addressee can infer this meaning on the basis of the evidence
(see Sperber & Wilson, in press). In order to understand the discovery and to
communicate an understandable version of it, individuals focused on intriguing aspects
of the message and associated them to lay vocabulary. Attitudinal concerns, in turn,
influenced anchoring processes in which people tend to assimilate information with
pre-existing knowledge and beliefs. Insofar as beliefs are shared within groups,
anchoring is not merely an intra-personal process of assimilation (see Joffe, 2003).
Besides raising diverging stances concerning genetic explanations of behaviour, we
assumed that the discovery about the role of vasopressin on sociability of voles would
interest individuals because it provided information related to faithfulness in romantic
relationships. Indeed, in addition to Le Monde, the discovery was reported in a number
of newspapers often referring to human applications. The experimental paradigm
simulating a communication chain allowed us to illustrate the directions an intriguing
scientific discovery takes in the course of its diffusion in society.
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The construction of meaning in social representations research has already been
examined by means of word associations that convey the content, structure, and
polarization of representations (e.g. Abric, 2003). The methodological originality of our
studies lies in the dynamic approach that analyses, with changes in vocabulary, the
transformation of a scientific message throughout the communication chain. In line with
Lakoff (1987) and Potter (1996), we argued that lexical descriptions involve semantic
categories and areaswhich allow expressing viewpoints. Concretely, participants adopted
a vocabulary to translate and adapt new and abstract information to their semantic and
pragmatic repertories. By deriving dependent variables from narratives, our approach
allowed the experimental investigation of the development of narratives in Studies 1 and 2.
One caveat of this approach is nevertheless the great variation in terminology in the
accounts produced by participants, which limited the number of usable indicators. Thus
the dependent measure could not be as accurately assessed as a Likert scale measure. In
support of this approach, a qualitative analysis of the narratives (Green &Cle´mence, 2002)
yielded similar tendencies to the results reported in this paper. Moreover, the word
selection task employed in Study 2 and the keyword associations in Study 3 were more
controlledmeasures that supported the results revealedby the narrativemeasures. Also the
content coding of central themes presented in Study 2 provided external validation of the
results. The absence of measures on retrieval processes limits the conclusions that can be
drawn from the results, since we were not able to disentangle the role of individual
memorization processes in our results. Focusing on distinct words in a semantic analysis
has yet another drawback, since words are separated from their immediate context.
Analysing the discourses employed by respondents would certainly provide a richer
understanding of the transformation and the transmission of the genetic discovery. Indeed,
the transcription of discussions between readers and listeners in the communication chain
and an in-depth analysis of the rhetoric employed in the written accounts are ways to
extend the current research.Notwithstanding these limits, our research showed the impact
of interpersonal communication and pre-existing beliefs on transmission and transform-
ation of the content of a scientific discovery. The study provides researchers insights on
factors influencing the comprehension and popularization of their findings in society. The
proposedmodel can be employed in other fields of communication from the study of basic
cultural transmissionprocesses (e.g.Mesoudi,Whiten,&Dunbar, 2006) to applieddomains
such as political or health communication.
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Appendix
Frequencies of 18 expert and lay terms in three databases
Word French Weba Frantextb Le Tempsc
Expert
Vasopressin 24 1 1
Receptor 208 9 8
Arginine 79 14 1
Vole 281 5 5
Prairie 0 – 0
Montane 0 – 0
Mammal 22,000 78 85
Monogam -ous, -y 76 10 6
Polygam -ous, -y 706 23 15
Lay
Hormone 1,500 269 73
Gene 79,300 444 581
Rat 88,600 754 177
Field 127 – 14
Mouse 165,000 1653 320
Animal 1,350,000 4,392 .1000
Faithful, -ness 41,200 2,648 356
Unfaithful, -ness 5,310 314 53
Mean ratio (lay/expert) 74 75 21
a Number of French web pages with the word in the title found with Yahoo search engine
(http://fr.yahoo.com/, October 12, 2005).
b Occurrences in a French database Frantext, a collection of 1,250 French texts including novels, essays,
and popular scientific writings published between 1900 and 2000 (http://www.frantext.fr/, University of
Nancy, 2005, October 14, 2005).
c Occurrences in all articles of a major Swiss French newspaper Le Temps between 1990 and 2000
(http://www.letemps.ch/, October 14, 2005).
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